(Taken from the forthcoming essay – The Caliph and Absent Authority)
Despite the spread of Islam with several conquests of other areas, there was plenty of internal rebellion in the early days of the Islamic nation. This began from the first caliph, Abū Bakr, who faced an immediate rebellion from those who rejected his leadership, claiming that they only paid the dues (zakāt) to the Prophet Muḥammad and that Abū Bakr had no claim over them. Abū Bakr’s decision to collect the zakāt by force if necessary was endorsed by the consensus of the companions in Madīna – though once they complied with the Islamic rule, they were not punished or sanctioned for their initial rebellious stance. Abū Bakr also faced sedition in the form of mass rebellion, with the rise of others who claimed leadership as “prophets”. Rejecting them as “false prophets” and treating the matter as rebellion, Abū Bakr maintained unity of the caliphate through military means – even though he faced military challenges on numerous fronts.
The first war over competition for the leadership was not far behind – with a conflict between the supporters of Ali ibn Abū Ṭālib, the son in law of the Prophet, on one side and Muʿāwiya and ʿĀ’isha bint Abū Bakr (one of the wives of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other. Both sides included people considered to be among the closest companions of the Prophet. While the first conflict involving Abū Bakr had clear lines drawn between the believers on one side and those who rejected the authority of any ruler after the death of the Prophet on the other (hence the naming of the conflict as the wars of ridda or apostacy) – the conflict between Muʿāwiyya and Ali was a much more internal affair involving the major personalities of the time and culminating in the battle of Ṣiffīn. The ostensible basis of the conflict was a dispute over how to deal with those who had killed the previous caliph.
Further conflicts later occurred stemming from the decision of Muʿawiya to select his son Yazīd as his successor and consolidate the caliphate within his family. These were initial conflicts involving some of the most respected and revered personalities in Muslim history – with sectarian schisms today having their origins in these strictly political events. These initial attempts at the imposition of dynastical rule were not met without dissent. There was resistance from the tribe of Banū Hāshim, among the descendants and relatives of the Prophet, many of whom were based in Medina. Muʿāwiya was advised by the son of ʿUmar that the issue of selecting a caliph should rely upon consultation[1] and that the caliphate was not a position to be inherited. The famous words attributed to him in that regard – that the caliphate was not a political position like those of Heraclius or Khosrow to be passed down from father to son[2] – were clear that dynastical rule was not part of the Islamic tradition.
[T]he implication of hereditary dynasties – which neither guaranteed leadership that was capable let alone the most capable, nor considered the consent of the ruled – meaning that the only way for political expression of opposition or getting close to power was through revolution. Therefore, the root problem was not one of revolution and rebellion, but of the nature of the transfer of power.
This resistance ultimately led to conflicts over generations, with several battles and struggles occurring over who should be the overall political leader for the Muslims. This is unsurprising, since withdrawing the peaceful mechanism for transfer of power would ultimately mean that violence would be the only recourse. The example of the election of the caliph by an electoral college, with any candidate only accepted into the position if they had the confidence and consent of the people, was an elusive ideal after the initial handful of rulers. This was due in part to the lack of any institutionalised mechanism to ensure its enactment, alongside competing political aspirations and the practical difficulty of establishing such an electoral college in an era when the Islamic caliphate had spread across a much larger geographical location representing many other peoples beyond the initial Arabian tribes that had embraced Islam.
It was thereafter not uncommon for competing dynasties to fight to take power, something recognised in the political theory around the discussion of whether the leader who took power by force was legitimate or not. According to classical opinions, if the people were forced to give their allegiance to such a leader, the latter would remain illegitimate, and it was permitted to rebel against him and install someone that had their backing.[3] Consequently, the doctrine that might makes right prevailed, with the caveat that after establishing power, victors could legitimize their rule by garnering voluntary allegiance rather than demanding subservience.
Despite, or perhaps because of this rich and bloody history of resistance, both practical and theoretical, the question of rebellion against an existing ruler is something that became more restricted over time. By the 13th century, the claims that there was a consensus among scholars that rebellion against a Muslim ruler was only permitted if he exhibited clear disbelief had become more dominant in mainstream Sunni theory, based upon a Prophetic narration of similar wording.[4] The trajectory of Islamic scholarship after the initial first few centuries was towards a quietism of a kind, at least with respect to rebellion – focusing on the need to obey whoever was in power, however he came to power, and so long as he was able to maintain stability, rebellion was thus forbidden in almost all circumstances.[5]
[R]ebellions took place throughout Islamic history, beginning with those by the close companions of the Prophet Muḥammad on issues much smaller than clear disbelief, or even clear sin, as has been discussed with respect to the dispute between Ali and Muʿawiya. It is inconceivable that they were not aware of the narrations that later Islamic scholars used as justification to prohibit rebellion, and indeed were likely to have been privy to many more details having been contemporaries of the Prophet who heard his words on the matter directly.
However, there are numerous examples of the same scholars that held such views showing that historically there had been conflicts with the rulers that would sometimes even result in punitive actions against them such as exile and imprisonment – highlighting that rejecting rebellion did not entail complete acquiescence or acceptance of anything the ruler may do. In other words, there needs to be a clear distinction drawn between resistance and rebellion, and while the latter was more restricted the former was not rejected.
The arguments posited by scholars, in trying to justify their views that rebellion against a flawed ruler was prohibited, were that early rebellions between notable Islamic figures were considered as having been permitted in their time and place. However, with the passing of time, the rationale changed to considering that stability under a flawed leader was a lesser evil than a rebellion which may lead to continued bloodshed and instability.[6]
An alternative view would have been to consider the implication of hereditary dynasties – which neither guaranteed leadership that was capable let alone the most capable, nor considered the consent of the ruled – meaning that the only way for political expression of opposition or getting close to power was through revolution. Therefore, the root problem was not one of revolution and rebellion, but of the nature of the transfer of power.
However, the general later scholarly response (with some exception) was to disavow rebellion based upon the Prophetic narration that a ruler had to be obeyed unless he committed “kufr bawāḥ”[7] (clear, unequivocal disbelief) and on the basis the principle of the lesser evil. While this position has its merits, it is by no means definitive and could be seen as relatively weak.
One criticism would be that there are other possible interpretations of this Prophetic narration, along with the fact that the same narration is also found with other wording such as a more permissive formulation that states that obedience is obligatory until a clear sin is committed. This opens the potential for a legitimate rebellion against an unjust ruler.
What really undermines this argument is that rebellions took place throughout Islamic history, beginning with those by the close companions of the Prophet Muḥammad on issues much smaller than clear disbelief, or even clear sin, as has been discussed with respect to the dispute between Ali and Muʿawiya. It is inconceivable that they were not aware of the narrations that later Islamic scholars used as justification to prohibit rebellion, and indeed were likely to have been privy to many more details having been contemporaries of the Prophet who heard his words on the matter directly. The argument of the later generations of scholars that there was now a consensus that meant rebellion was deemed illegitimate cannot be verified and given that there are various opinions on what constitutes consensus in the first place, such a claim would be disputable even if verified.
Irrespective of the relative weakness of the traditional view that formed over time, from a political theory standpoint there had emerged a mainstream position which both justified hereditary rule, while at the same time prohibiting rebellion. In other words, the Muslims were effectively distanced from both the choice of leader, and given no possible avenue to enforce a change, separating them further from key political choices that affected them as a whole. As such, the collective authority of the Muslim nation that was intended to be represented by the caliph was eroded.
[1] Al-Dīnawarī, 210.
[2] Aḥmad Zakī Ṣafwat, Jamharat kutub al-ʿarab fī ʿuṣūr al-ʿarabiyya al-zāhira, Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿilmiyya, Vol. 2, 248.
[3] Muḥammad Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2003, Vol. 4, 154.
[4] Abū Ḥusayn Muslim Abū al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī al-Nisābūrī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1998, Vol. 12, 179–180.
[5] Khaled Abou el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law, Cambridge: CUP, 2001, 238–240.
[6] Muslim, Vol. 12, 180.
[7] ibid.