Taken from “The Inevitable Caiphate” 2012, Hurst and Oxford University Press
The reality is that the hegemony of Western governments and values is being disputed more openly as time passes. As re-emerging powers such as Russia, China and India all assert themselves regionally and internationally, demands to adopt the political values and philosophy of Western European and American governments are less relevant to those involved. This is particularly the case as aforementioned values and philosophy lie largely discredited even in the heart of the West itself
There are many factors which can be said to set the scene for Muslim populations in the Middle East and beyond to seek alternatives to their current political order. These include the occupation of lands considered to be of religious significance such as Palestine, the oppression of Muslim populations in areas believed to be historically Islamic such as in Kashmir or the Caucasus region and poverty across wide swathes of the populations despite a wealth of natural and manpower resources in their regions, perceived subservience of the state to foreign agendas and that they mostly live under oppressive governments who have been imposed upon them and do not represent their interests and values and often deal with the general population as a security threat whether republics like Egypt, pseudo democracies like Pakistan or monarchies like those of Morocco or Jordan, and so on. These grievances are largely felt to be shared due to the collective Muslim identity as represented in the idea of the umma, even though the nation-state has now been the only form of polity in the region for a number of generations. With the failure of the nation-state to settle the problems faced by the umma the caliphate is posited as an alternative. Both the idea of the umma and its political representation being the caliphate are derived from Islamic sources – something that the structural factors cannot explain.
At the same time it could be argued that the multiplicity of groups with their own idiosyncratic methods and goals proves that there is no single Islam or Islamic ideal of politics but rather a multitude of “little Islams” and interpretations. The sometimes fractious relationships and discourse between individuals of these movements can be seen as further evidence of disunity and fundamental disagreement, with numerous tracts written by al-Qaeda against the Brotherhood in particular, or the fact that the Brotherhood member of parliament voted with the government to expel the Hizb ut-Tahrir member from the Jordanian assembly and so on.
However, the alternative thesis is that there is a space for differences within Islam based upon fundamental agreement. Such a thesis tells us that the approach of both the essentialists who consider Muslims to be a single monolithic bloc without difference, and the contingencists who view Islam as a nominal culture but ultimately irrelevant due to its multiplicity of interpretations, are inaccurate in explaining Islamic movements and their motivations and actions, which instead requires a framework which interprets their ideas and actions through their understanding of the driving force of their understanding – normative Islam. Though it is true that there are areas of difference and interpretation, this cannot be used as evidence to ignore some of the essential elements which are collectively shared. Within the Islamic jurisprudence there is scope for differences, with certain fundamental issues being agreed upon and not open to interpretation, while other issues have that flexibility afforded to them by the Islamic sources themselves.
The fact that there are variants within the Islamic understanding of politics does not detract from the presence of core aspects, much like in the same way that people can talk about democracy but also differentiate between its variants and forms which do not detract from the existence of a democratic ideal. Indeed, the caliphate ideal is based upon the idea of the unity of the Muslim umma under a single leader, and that the basis of the rule should be Islamic. There is a type of social contract between the ruler and the umma whereby he is appointed as their representative ultimately responsible for the implementation and arbitration of the shari‘a and to manage the public affairs of the population. These fundamental positions are enough to claim a unity of purpose for those who advocate for the caliphate, with differences in the institutions underneath a matter of ijtihad. There is also no dictate in normative Islam or in the literature of these contemporary movements that suggests that the word caliphate is the exclusive name for the Islamic political system, with alternative naming permitted while the core points remain the same.
How far popular agreement exists upon these two core issues is a matter open to interpretation, and any discussion about the role of the caliphate and its position in Muslim political discourse needs to be aware of the context of the dominant discourse which enforces the hegemony of liberal democracy as the yardstick for measuring political legitimacy, something which is plainly visible in the public political discourse within the media and public space. The popular uprising ending in the removal of Hosni Mubarak from the Egyptian presidency on February 11th 2011 is a good example of how this discourse is managed and perpetuated. Millions of protestors who took to the street were quickly labelled as “pro-democracy” across Western and international television channels and adopted by some of the young middle and upper class activists who helped organise the initial protests which were then joined by the wider Egyptian society. In such discourse, the position of Islam and Islamic politics is considered legitimate according to how far it is willing to work within the confines of a secular, democratic system, with commentators and analysts all questioning this specific issue well before any resolution regarding the end of the previous dictatorial regime. Therefore the call to a system which does not even accept the legitimacy of post-Versailles national boundaries is not to be given any credence.
However, the caliphate is now openly discussed in Egypt and beyond. In Yemen at the height of protests against then president Abdullah Ali Saleh, the leading opposition figure Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani informed the people that the re-establishment of the caliphate was approaching[1]. In Syria, local scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Eid told crowds of demonstrators in the city of Daraa that the return of the caliphate was inevitable[2]. The popular Saudi scholar Mohammad Arifi interpreted that the Arab spring was a sign of the nearing of the return of the caliphate[3]. These are a few amongst several others prominent Islamic personalities across the Middle East and North Africa who have openly talked about the re-establishment of the caliphate, almost invariably referring to the narration which ends with the promise “and then there will be caliphate (once again) upon the Prophetic method”[4]. This open discussion about the caliphate has compelled movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian an-Nahda to simultaneously use the slogan of the caliphate at times to satisfy certain popular demands while explaining it away within their program of gradualism and co-operation with secular politicians to appease opposition to Islamic rule, whether domestic or international.
Evidence from numerous polls taken in the last few years indicate that majorities or at a minimum substantial minorities in Muslim countries from Africa across to Asia favour political unification upon an Islamic basis with the application of shari‘a law by the government. At the same time democracy and freedom are normally praised, while Western values and secularism are rejected. Upon further investigation it becomes clear that while for example freedom of speech is praised, the belief that someone who insults Islam should be punished is heavily favoured, including the implementation of capital punishment for such offences in line with the majority view of the normative position found in Islamic scholarship. While people often agree that democracy is the best option, it is far from clear that they understand democracy in the same light as the pollsters who undertake work from the same starting point as criticised in the introduction – using democracy as the basic reference point for analysis. Therefore respondents generally living under regimes where elections count for very little and popular choice is not represented in government are asked to choose between statements such as “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” and “In some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be preferable”, possibly having been told all their lives that democracy means the election of government according to the people’s choice and not considering the finer details of what is meant by popular sovereignty[5].
It is therefore important that the democratic paradigm to either be dismissed in analysis of Islamic politics, or understood in a much more nuanced manner which would ultimately remove any meaning for the term itself. At most it should be used as a comparative tool and not a yardstick for acceptability.
Bruce Rutherford has written that the works of contemporary Islamic political theorists such as prominent Qatari based Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, widely acknowledged as one of the more popular scholarly figures in the Middle East due to his involvement and interaction with contemporary political issues across satellite television in the region, define Islamic constitutionalism in a manner that shares many characteristics with classical liberalism and democracy, as demonstrated by their belief in the rule of law, constraints on state power and public participation in politics. Rutherford’s work is perhaps one of the most thoughtful and provoking articles written on the subject of comparison between contemporary Islamic political theory and democracy, and he concludes that if democracy is considered a set of institutions that constrain the State, enforce law and allow for public political participation then the two are compatible. On the other hand if democracy is considered as a set of values such as individual liberty and popular sovereignty then the conclusion would be much more “ambiguous”[6]. This is reflected in the work of Qaradawi who claims that Muslims can adopt the tools and institutions of democracy, without embracing its philosophy[7], a typical position within the original ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and reflected also by the Tanzeem-e-Islami.
While these types of comparison are potentially enlightening and help introduce Islamic ideas of government to Western audiences in a language they can understand, a perusal of Qaradawi’s work reveals the problems with the adoption of a redefined democratic discourse, with discussion between him and others effectively becoming arguments over terminology rather than substance, which each side claiming values of democracy such as pluralism but meaning entirely different things by them[8]. There is nothing new or even specific to intra-Muslim debates in this, but submitting to or enforcing a hegemonic discourse that assumes the universality of a “democracy” which is in any event contested, with anything else labelled as “authoritarian” will hardly help in understanding what each side is positing as everyone rushes to claim the “democratic” mantle.
It is therefore important that the democratic paradigm to either be dismissed in analysis of Islamic politics, or understood in a much more nuanced manner which would ultimately remove any meaning for the term itself. At most it should be used as a comparative tool and not a yardstick for acceptability. If public sentiment for Islamic rule continues to grow and the call for greater unity increases, there is likely to be an increase in the discussions around the caliphate, its re-establishment and the form it should take. This is especially the case if there is an opportunity that leads to the opening of public space to discuss politics without restriction in the region. Analysis of these discussions should be done through approaches that appreciate the sources they are based upon, and without preconditions that they accept to be compatible with a democratic ideal which is in any case highly disputed and non-existent in a practical sense.
It should be noted at this stage that history has shown that the caliphate, whether in its Ottoman form or previously, had all manner of relations with external states and polities. These ranged from peaceful co-existence, to military support, to hostile relations to open warfare, much like the relations between polities throughout history. In any case the application of international relations theories of realism may align many of those speaking out against the idea of a unified Islamic State to accommodate it if it emerges for the sake of their own interests upon realisation of the resources that may be under its control.
Another concern is the media and political discourse around the caliphate emanating from the West since the end of the Cold War, but also after the Iranian revolution and then again post 2001. Islam and politics have long been seen as an undesirable mix, with the shari‘a being vilified, sometimes within a wider campaign of the vilification of Muslims and their values generally. There is an attempt to link aspirations for an Islamic unity and polity to the actions of those who are proclaimed as “terrorists” in the Western media, with the caliphate being considered an “extremist” goal. This can justifiably be considered as part of the propaganda to distract their own populations from the fact that interference in foreign lands whether by economic sanctions, wars, support for illegitimate regimes and a perceived partiality to Israel above the rights of the Palestinians are all causal factors for retaliation either by those directly affected or those who consider themselves as part of the collective identity of those who are.
It should be noted at this stage that history has shown that the caliphate, whether in its Ottoman form or previously, had all manner of relations with external states and polities. These ranged from peaceful co-existence, to military support, to hostile relations to open warfare, much like the relations between polities throughout history. In any case the application of international relations theories of realism may align many of those speaking out against the idea of a unified Islamic State to accommodate it if it emerges for the sake of their own interests upon realisation of the resources that may be under its control. However, the continued demonization of a polity considered as part of normative Islam will likely only be detrimental for relations with the populations in the Muslim countries where there is an substantial support for greater application of Islamic law and values in governance along with increased unity, irrespective of whether the masses are actively agitating for its re-establishment or not. In the past this was unlikely to cause much concern to Western policy-makers given their historical propensity to discount the popular feelings in the Middle East and Muslim countries in favour of supporting unrepresentative governments in the region alongside pursuing a range of what can be considered to be counter-productive policies vis-à-vis regional diplomacy, whether with respect to the question of Israel or Iran, but as the wheels of history turn such outlooks may be proven to look outdated and ill-judged, especially if the return of the caliphate is indeed an inevitability.
The reality is that the hegemony of Western governments and values is being disputed more openly as time passes. As re-emerging powers such as Russia, China and India all assert themselves regionally and internationally, demands to adopt the political values and philosophy of Western European and American governments are less relevant to those involved. This is particularly the case as aforementioned values and philosophy lie largely discredited even in the heart of the West itself, the result of the last century of Western actions with regards to the rest of the world, whether symbolised by the prisoners in Guantanamo bay at the start of the 21st century or those in Malta at the start of the 20th[9], along with a litany of foreign policy mishaps, crude realpolitik and human rights abuses in the century in between, which are too many to list, and too widely acknowledged to make it necessary to do so. The only remaining major attraction of the West was its model of economics and the “free market” model it readily imposed upon others, now also exposed as a hollow philosophy in light of the massive government bailouts of the private sector in 2008, and is openly questioned from within Western society itself given it’s apparent failure to deliver a fair model for society.
Consequently, the attempts to establish a form of Islamic polity which would be given legitimacy by its citizens should be accepted as alternatives to be examined in their own right, without a policy, deliberate or otherwise, of framing the debate to deny them validity or impose external conditions. While the triumphant claims to an end of history at the beginning of the so-called “New World Order” were derided at the time in some quarters and subsequently proven to be ill-judged, it may be that there is more than the rumblings of an end of a Western history, where the dominant narrative, universals and hegemonic discourse are not only challenged, but eventually overturned. As the peoples of the Middle East region and beyond find their voice and are able to articulate their demands for good governance publicly, it would be unrealistic to try to sideline those who propose Islamic solutions given their growing constituency and the likelihood that in the more open discursive environment the popularity of their ideas will continue to rise as they can articulate the authenticity of their vision of government from Islamic sources rather than a largely discredited Western civilisation which could be considered to be self-destructing in front of our eyes. This has been a contribution to these efforts, analyzing the discourses, ideas and methods of individuals and groups within their contextual circumstances, as well as situating those movements within a greater alternative history.
Dr. Reza Pankhurst is the author of The Inevitable Caliphate (Oxford University Press, 2012) and The Untold History of the Liberation Party (C Hurst & Co, 2016)
[1] Abdul Majid al-Zindani, “Sheikh Zindani in Yemen Calls for “Khilafah Rashidah”,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcBMJl0ESyY.
[2] Yusuf al-Eid, “Sheikh Yusuf Al-Eid Yubashir Bi Auda Al-Khilafa Fi Suriya,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEld6EZ_qfY.
[3] Mohammad al-Arifi, “Sheikh Muhammad ‘Arifi on the Arab Spring and Signs of Khilafah’s Return,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjaw-NA1Xno.
[4] Ahmad bin Hanbal, Musnad Al-Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal
(Beirut: Muassisa al-Risala, 1999), vol. 30 pp. 355 narration 18406.
[5] Numerous polls and reports can be referred to including:
WorldPublicOpinion.org, “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, attacks on civilians and al-Qaeda ” (The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2007).
———, “Defamation of Religion,” (The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2009).
Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa,” (Washington 2010).
Dalia Mogahed, “Special Report: Muslim World – Islam and Democracy,” (Washington D.C.: The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, 2006).
John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who speaks for Islam? : what a billion Muslims really think : based on Gallup’s World Poll–the largest study of its kind (New York, NY: Gallup Press, 2007).
[6] Bruce K. Rutherford, “What do Egypt’s Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006): pp.730-1.
[7] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Min Fiqh al-Dawla fi-l-Islam (Cairo: Dar al-Sharouq, 1997), pp.150.
[8] See for example al-Sayyed Yasin, al-Khilafa wal-Mu’asira (Cairo: Tobgy Press, 1999).
[9] Political prisoners, such as the some of the leading advocates of the Indian Khilafat movement, were imprisoned by the British Empire on the island of Malta during the early 20th century.