The caliphate and absent authority
Reza Pankhurst
Introduction
By the time of the formal abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the final caliph Abdülmecid II was a mere figurehead unable to exert any power or influence to resist the turn of events. He was not even the caliph of the Ottoman sultanate, the sultanate having been abolished in 1922. The real power of the caliph had diminished since 1908, when the caliphate was separated from executive power – leaving the last caliph of the Ottoman sultanate a symbolic figure. Though throughout the long history of Muslim states the centrality of the caliph waxed and waned before being revived by the Ottomans, this final form of the caliph as powerless symbol stands in stark contrast to its initial form as a centralised source of executive power for the Muslims after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad.
Even the last caliph often feted by Muslims – Sultan Abdülhamid II – held office that was significantly different from that of the first caliphs. The caliphate had become a position passed down through dynasties as hereditary ruling, unaccountable to the masses. Those changes were not recent – the seeds of all of them were sowed in the first generations of Muslim leadership, but it was the aftermath of World War 1 that brought matters to a head.
After the sultanate was abolished in 1922, a number of prominent thinkers across the Muslim world protested the decision, with a series of articles addressing Turkish Muslims by Rashīd Riḍā provoking a response from the Turkish government entitled “The Caliphate and the Sovereignty of the People”. With a nod to the imagined latent support within Turkey and across the Muslim world for the institution of the caliphate, the book agreed that a caliphate which met all its proscribed conditions was the best possible form of government. The reality was that the Ottoman caliphate merely mimicked the form of a caliphate and lacked its juristic conditions rendering it nothing more than a hereditary monarchy. The Ottoman rulers were not selected by the people or any other validly recognised method, and so the Ottoman caliphate was at best a “superficial caliphate”.[1]
In October 1923 the Turkish government became a republic. Addressing the Turkish national assembly, Mustafa Kemal stated that “after the abolition of the monarchy, the caliphate, being only an authority of a similar description under another name, was also abolished”[2]. For all intents and purposes, this was true. The formal act of abolition took place on March 3, 1924.
Irrespective of his ultimate motives, the conclusions of both the book issued by the Turkish government and Kemal’s own statements are difficult to dispute, at least in so far as the nature of the transfer of power within the caliphate was concerned, and the abolition of the institution of the caliphate has meant that the theory of the caliphate can be considered without the constraints and bias that its presence may have induced in the theorists who articulated their views while living under the system as constituted in their time. This is why when contemporary movements call for the restoration of the caliphate – they are not calling for the restoration of the caliph of Turkey, or the caliph bereft of the authority, or even for the best Caliphs of the Ottoman dynasty, but rather for the restoration of the institution upon what is referred to as the Prophetic model as has been conveyed in narrations attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad.[3]
This essay reviews certain key elements of the political theory of the caliphate in normative Sunni Islamic thought which adapted over time, and in this author’s view in difference to the initial practise – who should be the caliph and the role of the Muslims in how they are selected, how the caliph and those in roles of executive power should be accounted, the role and limits of rebellion and who should be involved in matters of deciding the caliph.
What is the caliph and caliphate
The caliphate has been defined as the “succession of Prophethood as a means of protecting the dīn (religion) and of managing the affairs of this world”[4]. In essence, it refers to the political authority and leadership of the Muslim community that is responsible for upholding Islamic principles domestically and representing the faith internationally.
According to Islamic legal tradition, the presence of the caliphate – or a Muslim leader to represent Islam internationally and domestically – is considered a collective obligation upon the Muslims. There are few elements in normative Islam that are agreed upon. Obligations such as the five daily prayers, the Ḥajj pilgrimage and fasting are all considered obligations upon the individual by consensus. Similarly, the appointment of a caliph is considered one of those few obligations that has a comprehensive consensus including the consensus of the companions of the Prophet behind it (which is the most emphatic form of consensus considered in normative Islam). The main difference between the major sects in Islam is not over the obligation itself, but over whether the caliph is elected by the consent of the people, or appointed by God through revelation[5].
In other words, there was consensus that Muslims required a unified, single leadership to serve as their representative in implementing Islam both domestically and internationally, for both practical and religious reasons. This agreement is also reflected in the views of those contemporary movements that have called for its re-establishment[6].
The idea of the caliph being the representative of the Muslim nation, implementing Islam on its behalf may be helpfully explained through the well-worn example of people embarking on journey together to the same destination. Such a group elects one of their own as the head of the travelling party, with the agreement that he leads them to their destination using any of the recognised routes there. In the case of the caliphate, the destination is to fulfil their obligations to God and seek His pleasure, and the recognised routes are the different Islamic legal opinions adjudged to fall within the ambit of legitimate difference.
In summary, the caliphate is a title that identifies the state (in the broad meaning of governing authority, rather than the narrow Westphalia nation state) that rules the Muslim nation, with the caliph being the head of state representative responsible to ensure that Islam is implemented. The naming of the institution and ruler is not an essential characteristic, with other terms such as amīr al-mu’minī (leader of the believers) or al-sulṭān al-aʿaẓm (the greater Sultan) often used interchangeably to signify what is meant to be the highest executive political position in Islamic political theory.
Choosing the caliph – between election, appointment and birth-right
Appointment of a caliph is through a contractual process known as bayʿah (translating as ‘pledge’). In classical Islamic literature, the pledge of allegiance to the caliph is one that is contracted between the caliph and the Muslim nation. Pledge implies fealty by one party in the contract (the Muslim nation) – but in Islamic theory this pledge is conditional upon the other party, the caliph, to uphold their contractual duty according to Islamic law.
For this to have been practically actionable, the caliph was contracted through the pledge of allegiance by a group from the community referred to as ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd, literally translated as ‘those who bind and contract’ but will be referred to here as the electoral college given their equivalent role.[7]
There are some differing views over the conditions as to who would qualify as a member of this electoral college, but in general terms they were those (men) who have the requisite Islamic knowledge and political awareness and insight to make the choice of who would be the most capable or appropriate caliph.[8] Moreover, they were people who were known to command sufficient respect that their pledge genuinely represented the authority of the people.
This theory was derived from the fact that the matter of choosing the caliph was left to his companions by the Prophet Muḥammad, as he did not appoint anyone as his successor. Consequently, upon his death there was debate among the companions as to who would take on the political leadership of the Muslims. This was referred to as the saqīfa (courtyard) debate, so named after the apparent lo cation that it took place in. Senior figures who were local to the city where Prophet Muḥammad had established the first political Muslim community, known as the Ansar (supporters), held discussions with similarly senior members who had followed the Prophet from his home city of Mecca and were thus known as the Muhājirīn (emigrants)
The eventual choice of successor to the Prophet was one of his companions from Mecca, Abū Bakr. The first key element of the discussion as per the narrator Ibn ʿAbbās (another of the Muhājirīn) was that “whoever gave the pledge of allegiance to a man without consulting the Muslims, it is as if he has no pledge of allegiance”[9]. The second was that it was necessary to choose someone from the leaders of the Muhājirīn since they were members of the Quraysh tribe. As part of the saqīfa debate, the point was raised that “the Arabs won’t follow a leader unless he was
Quraysh”[10]. In other words, the claim was that the Arabs would not accept a caliph from any other tribe at that time, due to the importance the Arabs placed upon lineage and the central location the Quraysh maintained along with their custodianship of the Kaʿba.
The second method considered valid in traditional Islamic political theory was that of istikhlāf, the appointment of a successor by the previous leader. This was derived from an understanding of how the appointment of the second caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, was conducted by the first.[11] While on his death-bed Abū Bakr counselled the companions around him that they needed to appoint another leader after him and offered them that he would use his judgement to make the most appropriate selection if they were content to adopt his opinion, to which they agreed.[12] He then proceeded to consult the various companions one by one, until coming to the conclusion that the best choice to maintain the unity of the Muslims would be ʿUmar, and wrote his opinion accordingly. After his death, that view was then taken to the people and they were asked whether they were content to endorse the view of Abū Bakr, which they confirmed, leading to the appointment of ʿUmar.[13]
The third method found in the literature, though it is generally classified as part of the second method rather than a separate third, is direct appointment of the next leader by the previous without the need for anyone else’s consent. This theory is not based upon Prophetic precedence, but rather was an answer to the question of how the caliphate was historically passed between family members in a dynastical manner, beginning with the caliphate of Muʿāwiyya ibn Abū Sufyān when he enforced his son as the next caliph upon the Muslims despite having minimal to no support, thus establishing the Ummayad dynasty.
As a result, there emerged a difference in the political theory over whether the whether the appointment then has to be confirmed by the Muslims via the mechanism of their representatives signifying their contentment with the decision, with the scholars who didn’t consider it to be a necessity plainly justifying hereditary rule.[14] While it could be argued that the original view of istikhlāf is also arguably just a cover for the justification of hereditary rule, at least it acknowledged that any appointment cannot be considered contractually valid and complete unless it is confirmed through the pledge of allegiance given to him by the Muslim umma.[15]
Despite the lack of Prophetic precedent, acceptance of direct appointment is the opinion that is found and attributed as a correct view in classic Islamic political theory. As one example, in al-Māwardī’s work which is pre-eminent in the field he justifies this opinion upon the basis that ʿUmar was appointed the ruler without the express consent of the people.[16]
This argument is not particularly convincing given the various narrations previously referenced that expressly mention Abū Bakr first taking the permission of the people around him to follow his view on who should be the next leader, then proceeding to consult people individually finally upon his death the generality of the people were asked whether they were content to follow his view.
In summary, though Abū Bakr proposed his successor after consultations, this was done on behalf of the people and with their prior agreement including their assenting to accept his choice after his death, and so the agreement and consent of the people was the actual determinant rather than Abū Bakr having an inherent right to select a successor.
It may be argued that the opinion of direct appointment was formulated in response to the status quo of dynastical rule that settled after the initial generation of leaders for the sake of maintaining their legitimacy and therefore maintaining the peace. Yet any study of the history indicates that the efforts to establish such dynasties were themselves major causes of bloodshed in and of themselves that occurred due to resistance against the imposition of leadership who had little to no popular backing.
Accounting the caliph – from rebellion to quietism
Despite the spread of Islam with several conquests of other areas, there was plenty of internal rebellion in the early days of the Islamic nation. This began from the first caliph, Abū Bakr, who faced an immediate rebellion from those who rejected his leadership, claiming that they only paid the dues (zakāt) to the Prophet Muḥammad and that Abū Bakr had no claim over them. Abū Bakr’s decision to collect the zakat by force if necessary was endorsed by the consensus of the companions in Madina – though once they complied with the Islamic rule, they were not punished or sanctioned for their initial rebellious stance. Abū Bakr also faced sedition in the form of mass rebellion, with the rise of others who claimed leadership as ‘prophets’. Rejecting them as ‘false prophets’ and treating the matter as rebellion, Abū Bakr maintained unity of the caliphate through military means – even though he faced military challenges on numerous fronts.
The first war over competition for the leadership was not far behind – with a conflict between the supporters of Ali ibn Abū Ṭālib, the son in law of the Prophet, on one side and Muʿāwiyya and ʿĀ’isha bint Abū Bakr (one of the wives of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other. Both sides included people considered to be among the closest companions of the Prophet. While the first conflict involving Abū Bakr had clear lines drawn between the believers on one side and those who rejected the authority of any ruler after the death of the Prophet on the other (hence the naming of the conflict as the wars of ridda or apostacy) – the conflict between Muʿāwiyya and Ali was a much more internal affair involving the major personalities of the time and culminating in the battle of Ṣiffīn . The ostensible basis of the conflict was a dispute over how to deal with those who had killed the previous caliph.
Further conflicts later occurred stemming from the decision of Muʿawiya to select his son Yazid as his successor and consolidate the caliphate within his family. These were initial conflicts involving some of the most respected and revered personalities in Muslim history – with sectarian schisms today having their origins in these strictly political events. These initial attempts at the imposition of dynastical rule were not met without dissent. There was resistance from the tribe of Banū Hāshim, among the descendants and relatives of the Prophet, many of whom were based in Medina. Muʿawiya was advised by the son of ʿUmar that the issue of selecting a caliph should rely upon consultation[17] and that the caliphate was not a position to be inherited. The famous words attributed to him in that regard – that the caliphate was not a political position like those of Heraclius or Khosrow to be passed down from father to son[18] – were clear that dynastical rule was not part of the Islamic tradition.
This resistance ultimately led to conflicts over generations, with several battles and struggles occurring over who should be the overall political leader for the Muslims. This is unsurprising, since withdrawing the peaceful mechanism for transfer of power would ultimately mean that violence would be the only recourse. The example of the election of the caliph by an electoral college, with any candidate only accepted into the position if they had the confidence and consent of the people, was an elusive ideal after the initial handful of rulers. This was due in part to the lack of any institutionalised mechanism to ensure its enactment, alongside competing political aspirations and the practical difficulty of establishing such an electoral college in an era when the Islamic caliphate had spread across a much larger geographical location representing many other peoples beyond the initial Arabian tribes that had embraced Islam.
It was thereafter not uncommon for competing dynasties to fight to take power, something recognised in the political theory around the discussion of whether the leader who took power by force was legitimate or not. According to classical opinions, if the people were forced to give their allegiance to such a leader, the latter would remain illegitimate, and it was permitted to rebel against him and install someone that had their backing.[19] Consequently, the doctrine that might makes right prevailed, with the caveat that after establishing power, victors could legitimize their rule by garnering voluntary allegiance rather than demanding subservience.
Despite, or perhaps because of this rich and bloody history of resistance, both practical and theoretical, the question of rebellion against an existing ruler is something that became more restricted over time. By the 13th century, the claims that there was a consensus among scholars that rebellion against a Muslim ruler was only permitted if he exhibited clear disbelief had become more dominant in mainstream Sunni theory, based upon a Prophetic narration of similar wording.[20] The trajectory of Islamic scholarship after the initial first few centuries was towards a quietism of a kind, at least with respect to rebellion – focusing on the need to obey whoever was in power, however he came to power, and so long as he was able to maintain stability rebellion was thus forbidden in almost all circumstances.[21] (However, there are numerous examples of the same scholars that held such views showing that historically there had been conflicts with the rulers that would sometimes even result in punitive actions against them such as exile and imprisonment – highlighting that rejecting rebellion did not entail complete acquiescence or acceptance of anything the ruler may do. In other words, there needs to be a clear distinction drawn between resistance and rebellion, and while the latter was more restricted the former was not rejected).
The arguments posited by scholars in trying to justify their views that rebellion against a flawed ruler was prohibited, was that early rebellions between notable Islamic figures were considered as having been permitted in their time and place. However, with the passing of time, the rationale changed to considering that stability under a flawed leader was a lesser evil than a rebellion which may lead to continued bloodshed and instability.[22]
An alternative view would have been to consider the implication of hereditary dynasties – which neither guaranteed leadership that was capable let alone the most capable, nor considered the consent of the ruled – meaning that the only way for political expression of opposition or getting close to power was through revolution. Therefore, the root problem was not one of revolution and rebellion, but of the nature of the transfer of power.
However, the general later scholarly response (with some exception) was to disavow rebellion based upon the Prophet narration that a ruler had to be obeyed unless he committed “kufr bawāḥ”[23] (clear, unequivocal disbelief) and on the basis the principle of the lesser evil. While this position has its merits, it is by no means definitive and could be seen as relatively weak. One criticism would be that there are other possible interpretations of this Prophetic narrations, along with the fact that the same narration is also found with other wording such as a more permissive formulation that states that obedience is obligatory until a clear sin is committed. This opens the potential for a legitimate rebellion against an unjust ruler.
What really undermines this argument is that rebellions took place throughout Islamic history, beginning with those by? the close companions of the Prophet Muḥammad on issues much smaller than clear disbelief, or even clear sin, as has been discussed with respect to the dispute between Ali and Muʿawiya. It is inconceivable that they were not aware of the narrations that later Islamic scholars used as justification to prohibit rebellion, and indeed were likely to have been privy to many more details having been contemporaries of the Prophet who heard his words on matter directly. The argument of the later generations of scholars that there was now a consensus that meant rebellion was deemed illegitimate cannot be verified, and given that there are various opinions on what constitutes consensus in the first place means that such a claim would be disputable even if verified.
Irrespective of the relative weakness of the traditional view that formed over time, from a political theory standpoint there had emerged a mainstream position which both justified hereditary rule, while at the same time prohibiting rebellion. In other words, the Muslims were effectively distanced from both the choice of leader, and given no possible avenue to enforce a change, separating them further from key political choices that affected them as whole. As such, the collective authority of the Muslim nation that was intended to be represented by the caliph was eroded.
Who needs to choose?
The evolution of the conceptions of how the leader should be appointed began from the idea that they would be selected by an electoral college that represented the views of Muslims, and evolved to the final viewpoint that a successor could be appointed by the current leader and be considered valid without any other input. This justification of? the dynastical rule further entrenched the idea as the normative position and de facto structure of Muslim polities including the final example of the Ottomans.
Though this conclusion emerged over time, it is clear that there were alternative understandings that are mentioned in various works on political theory, with the views closer to the Prophetic example that selecting a leader was not permissible without the consent of the electoral college, and importantly that the electoral college had to be representative of the whole of the Muslim nation, and therefore the people of each area had to give their assent.[24] This view also correlates with the understanding that as a contract between the leader and the Muslims, the pledge of allegiance had to be taken with the full consent of both sides to be considered valid Islamically, since any contract taken under duress is considered null and void.[25]
Since having an appointed ruler that represented Muslims and Islam politically was considered obligatory, the act of selecting that ruler was also considered to be a collective obligation (farḍ al-kifāya). The meaning of collective obligation as opposed to individual obligation is that while individual obligations (such as prayer or fasting) are concerned with the acts that each individual has to undertake to meet his obligations, collective obligations (such as burying the dead, or appointing the caliph) are concerned with the outcomes rather than the individual act, and so long as the outcome is met then the obligation has also been met. However, if the outcome is not met, then the obligation falls upon all individuals until the outcome is met.
With respect to the issue of appointing the caliph – the fact that it is considered a collective rather than individual obligation entails that the outcome of having a caliph appointed is sufficient for the obligation to be met. If a caliph is not appointed, then the whole of the umma is considered sinful until one is appointed.
However, this default position was refined by a number of scholars with respect to the caliphate, and in their view the collective obligation did not fall upon all Muslims, but only upon those who were considered to be part of the electoral college and those who were capable to be the leader.[26] In other words, anyone outside of these two groups was considered blameless for the inactivity or incapability of those of influence to establish the caliphate.
The justification for this limitation was one of capability – in that only those who were capable of either being the leader or appointing the leader were culpable for the absence of a leader. The basis for this view being that the companions at the time of the Prophet did not consult with everyone in Madina upon who should be appointed the leader of the Muslims, and the same happened with subsequent appointments. Therefore, since the appointment is limited to those influential people who make up the electoral college, the obligation is likewise limited to them.
This viewpoint ignores that the theory behind the electoral college is that it is intended to be representative of the views of the Muslims – in other words since it is was not in those times practical to have all the Muslims directly involved in the appointment of the caliph, those who were representative of the views of the majority or who the majority would follow were considered as viable members of the electoral college.
Though some scholars opined that the electoral college should be representative of the whole Muslim nation, al-Māwardī rejected this view since those in Madina did not seek the opinions of those outside of Madina when they were deciding who the first caliph should be.[27] One counter-argument is that this view fails to consider that Madina was the centre of the nascent Muslim civilisation and its capital, with the majority of the close companions of the Prophet therein at the time of his death. In fact, those who took part in the discussions to appoint the first caliph were in fact representative of the whole Muslim nation. Another being that the evidence that are used to prove that appointing a caliph is obligatory address the Muslims in general, and there is no other Prophetic evidence to restrict that to a privileged electoral class.
The merits of the view held by al-Māwardī have been debated in literature elsewhere, with the conclusion that while the obligation may be more pressing on the two groups of people identified, if those two groups do not meet the obligation to appoint a leader, then the sin of neglecting the obligation falls upon the whole Muslims until one is appointed. This is consistent with the understanding of what constitutes a collective obligation in Islamic jurisprudence, and aligns more closely to the understanding exhibited of the early companions.[28]
Importantly, the view held by al-Māwardī and others is another example of how core elements of Islamic political theory served to distance the masses from politics rather than involving them more closely. By removing the obligation of ensuring the establishment of a caliphate and election of its leader from the common Muslim, the natural resulting conclusion is that the absence of a caliph – while possibly being detrimental in terms of their ability to practise their religion fully – was not sinful for the average Muslim in and of itself, and therefore by implication not their priority. In summary – not only were their choice of leader being restricted, and avenues for dissent closed, but the logical conclusion of such views was that it was ultimately not part of their concern.
Returning the authority to the umma
While Muslims believe that Islam is timeless, the interpretation of Islamic laws and their application is bound by time and place. Not only that: even though Islamic scholars may exert effort to look at the sources of Islamic law and derive rules from them in as neutral a form as possible, attempting to separate themselves from the bias of the society they currently reside in, it is only natural that the prevailing norms and ideas may colour their interpretations. In theory, Islamic jurisprudence is aimed towards understanding the ruling of Allah on any issue. Hence, whilst a degree of bias maybe inevitable, it needs to be recognised and tempered as much as possible to avoid unduly influencing the interpretation of the texts.
With that in mind, is it likely that over time, Muslim scholars approached Islamic political theory coloured by the prevalent political systems of their time? That hereditary ruling was more easily accepted, that evidence was analysed and interpreted in such a manner to reach the conclusion that it was permitted, given that the prevalent ruling systems surrounding the Muslim civilisation were based on such systems? That a privileged elite ought to be concerned with the affairs of selecting a ruler, and no one else, to the point that the original popular conception of the caliphate became an elite theory of caliphate?
Perhaps this is the case. If so, it can also be argued that today, at a time when the ideas of universal suffrage, voting rights for the masses and so on are an established part of the political landscape, that such concepts would colour any contemporary interpretation of Islamic political theory.
While such an argument is not without merit, it ignores a fundamental differentiation between what we can term as sovereignty and authority that exists in Islamic political theory. Sovereignty in this content relating to who or what is the source of law, with authority meaning who has the right to implement those laws. In Islamic political theory – the source of law is God, whereas the source of authority according to normative Sunni Islam is the Muslim nation. In contrast, democratic theory makes no real difference between the two, with authority being in the hands on the electorate and sovereignty in the hands of the government they elect on their behalf. In other words, the theory of a caliph elected by the people mirrors a democracy only in so far as the mechanism of election is concerned, while the fundamental question of who rules remains diametrically opposed.
Furthermore, the texts on the issue of the pledge are clear that the caliph is ideally the choice of the people, and that there must be mutual acceptance and agreement between the two. An interrogation of the practise of the first generation of Muslims corroborates this, from Abū Bakr’s seeking the consent of the people to suggest a successor to ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s council to help decide his successor. All of this strongly indicates that the elite theory of caliphate is the aberration, with the idea of a caliph being the choice of the people the more justifiable and coherent position.
The contemporary political environment and available technology indicate that the implementation of such a theory is not impracticable due to geographical distance or difficulty in assessing the views of the masses. In the original sources from which Islamic law is derived there is a rich political culture connected to the caliph that emerged in the nascent Islamic civilisation after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad. Returning to those sources would be an effort to revert to the original conception, which over time was slowly stripped of its vitality. The final form of the Ottoman caliph bore no resemblance to the original conception of a caliph infused with the authority of the people who gave him their pledge to follow him so long as he applied Islam upon them all.
In the current vacuum of Islamic leadership on the international stage, rather than national interests (irrespective of any Islamic rhetoric used), there is a copious amount of material in the original sources of Islam and early history that can be and has been re-examined, with interpretations that are demonstrably closer to the original theory than found in some of the classical literature. It is a political theory that – rather than justifying hereditary rule, legitimising the acquiescence of the ruled, or separating the masses from the selection, accounting and removal of the ruler – empowers and engages the masses in the political arena and fulfils the Prophetic ideal and that of the early companions that the leader is chosen as the most capable from the people to implement Islam upon them and represent Islam internationally. A meritocracy not a dynasty.
In the past, Muslim scholars worried that political rebellion would lead to widespread bloodshed. This led them to develop theories that discouraged challenging established rulers. However, rebellion against repressive regimes cannot be dismissed as lacking any justification, and the only way to return authority taken by force is through mass political participation, in whatever form that may take.
If a theory that engaged wider participation was applied in the election and accounting of the caliph, they could not be exiled without significant public backlash. Removing a popularly elected caliph would mean removing the chosen representative of the people. An actively engaged society would likely view this as an attack on their own authority, rather than simply an attack against a symbolic relic of the past.
Such a caliph would presumably have deep support from a politically active populace who recognized threats to the caliph as threats to themselves. This stands in contrast to kings and military rulers whose superficial loyalty stems only from their court rather than the general public, and who rely upon fear in place of consent.
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[1] Abdul al-Ghani Bek, Al-Khilafa Wa Sulta Al-Umma (Cairo: Dar al-Nahr, 1924), pp. 100/ 20.
[2] Kemal Mustapha, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1929), pp. 583.
[3] For a comparative analysis of contemporary movements who have called for the restoration of a caliphate or Islamic state, refer to Reza Pankhurst, The Inevitable Caliphate? London: Hurst & Company, 2013.
[4] Abul Hasan Ali al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyya (Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiya), 6.
[5] Abdul Qadir al-Baghdadi, Usool Al-Deen (Istanbul: Matba al-Dawla, 1928), 271; Ali bin Ahmad bin Said bin Hazm al-Dhahari, Al-Fasl Fil-Malal Wal-Ahwa Wal-Nahl (Cairo: Maktaba al-Khanji), vol 4, 72; al-Mawardi, 5; Mohammad bin al-Hussain al-Fara, Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyya (Beirut: dar al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1983), 19.
[6] Pankhurst, 203.
[7] An electoral college is generally considered a set of electors who are selected to elect a candidate to a particular role or office, with the electors being selected from a wider group – the equivalence being made here is that ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd were those select individuals who represented their people, normally as a result of their position as tribal leaders or influential personalities within the tribe
[8] Abdul Malik bin Abdullah al-Juwaini, Al-Ghiyathi (Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 2003), 33-6.
[9] Abdul Malik bin Hisham, Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyya (Beirut: Maktab al-Sofa, 2001), v 4. 214.
[10] Ibid., v. 4, 214; al-Fara, 19.
[11] al-Mawardi, 11.
[12] ibn Qutaybah al-dinawari, Al-Imama Wa Al-Siyasa (Beirut: Dar al-Adwa, 1990), 38.
[13] Wahba bin Mustafa al-Zuhayli, Fiqh Al-Islami Wa Adilatuhu, 10 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr), v 8, 175.
[14] al-Juwaini, 67; al-Mawardi, 11.
[15] al-Fara, 25.
[16] al-Mawardi, 11.
[17] al-dinawari, 210.
[18] Ahmad Zaki Safwat, Jamhara Khutub Al-Arab Fi Al-Asr Al-Arabiyya (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-`ilmiyya), v 2, 248.
[19] Muhammad Abu Bakr bin al-`Arabi, Ahkam Al-Quran (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`ilmiyya, 2003), v 4, 154.
[20] Abul Husain ‘Asakir-ud-Din Muslim, Sahih Muslim (Beirut: dar al-fikr, 1998), v 12, 179-80.
[21] Khaled Abou el Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 238-40.
[22] Muslim, v 12, 180.
[23] Ibid.
[24] al-Mawardi, 9.
[25] Muhammad Mustafa al-Zuhayli, Al-Qawa’id Al-Fiqhiyya Wa Tatbiquha` Ala Al-Mathahib Al-Arba`A (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2006), v 2, 318.
[26] al-Mawardi, 6.
[27] Ibid., 7.
[28] Abdullah bin Umar bin Sulaiman al-Damiji, Al-Imama Al-Uthma ‘Ind Ahl Al-Sunna Wa-L-Jama’a (Riyadh: Dar Tiba, 2006), 75.